What is the Problem?
Although most people have non thought explicitly about the mathematics of voting, most people have noticed the booby traps of plurality voting. It is possible, and even common, for a “spoiler” to throw off the race. In US presidential elections, Ralph Nader may hold cost Al Gore the race in 2000, and Ross Perot may hold done the same thing to both Bob Dole in 1996 and George H. W. Bush in 1992. Furthermore, in the primary elections, this consequence may be even more prevailing. The job is that each elector has to do a judgement call and choice merely one campaigner to back up. Similar campaigners can stop up dividing ballots and losing to a less popular option.
Calculate the Condorcet victor
Fortunately, we do n't really necessitate to keep an election between every brace of campaigners to place the Condorcet victor, every bit long as we use discriminatory voting ballots ( each elector submits a graded list ) and do one really credible premise. For each elector, if a campaigner is removed from the race, we assume that the remainder of the campaigners would remain in the same order on the ballot. With this modest premise, a tete-a-tete lucifer between two campaigners can be calculated by dividing the electors harmonizing to who ranked which campaigner higher, irrespective of how high or how low they are on the list.
A Condorcet victor ever exists
A glimpse at the content of this web site ( utilizing the bill of fare at the top left ) will corroborate that a Condorcet victor exists when doing of import determinations, even though sentiments may be diverse. In our four information sets, we see different demographics and different victors, but in all instances there is a Condorcet victor. In fact, even when we divide the informations sets by political party or by day of the month, giving many more opportunities to happen a rhythm that breaks the otherwise robust Condorcet method, we still ever have a Condorcet victor. Even more unbelievable is that we about ever have a complete Condorcet order with no rhythms among any campaigners. This means we still would hold had a Condorcet victor had we conducted this study with any subset of the campaigners. To exceed it off, if we combine all informations from all four polls, even though the demographics and voting consequences disagree so dramatically, we still find a complete Condorcet order.
Some other methods claim to be robust
Unfortunately, it is non plausible that tonss would non be changed when a campaigner is removed. In the least, electors tend to distribute out their tonss to utilize the full scope. If a elector 's favourite campaigner had non been portion of the race, it 's likely that they would hold given another campaigner the highest mark allowable. If there are merely two campaigners, for illustration, it does n't do sense for a elector to make anything other than give the highest possible mark to the preferable campaigner and the lowest mark to the other campaigner. Anything else would be tantamount to merely projecting a fraction of a ballot.
Robust to Voters ( Strategic voting )
Our research documents ( in readying ) show two cardinal observations. First, for all voting systems that we inspected that are non Condorcet methods, in all voting state of affairss ( penchant profiles ) there is some part of the population that has an inducement to project an overdone ballot. No remainder for the weary elector. In contrast, the Condorcet method has many state of affairss where no electors in the full population have an inducement to overstate. In fact, any clip that the ballot finally identifies a Condorcet victor, no elector had an inducement to overstate their ballot. This is non a happenstance. There is a geometric ground why the Condorcet method, based on pairwise comparings, does non honor overdone voting.
The 2nd observation is really rather absorbing. Suppose that you do non accept our philosophical statement for utilizing the Condorcet method, and you decide to utilize another voting system, such as the Borda count. See that an election procedure may non go on in an blink of an eye. As a run progresses, polls and other uncomplete feedback aid inform the electors of the best scheme for projecting their ballot. Under a really simple theoretical account that allows persons in a population to dynamically set their scheme, and their ballot, as they receive feedback about the remainder of the population, a singular thing happens. The population inadvertently adjusts their ballots until they elect the Condorcet victor anyhow. This does n't go on for all voting systems, but it does for the Borda count, and possibly others.
Abstract Estonia was the first state in the universe to utilize Internet voting nationally, and today more than 30 % of its ballots are cast online. In this paper, we analyze the security of the Estonian I-voting system based on a combination of in the flesh election observation, codification reappraisal, and adversarial testing. Adopting a menace theoretical account that considers the advanced menaces faced by a national election system—including dishonest insiders and state-sponsored attacks—we find that the I-voting system has serious architectural restrictions and procedural spreads that potentially jeopardize the unity of elections. In experimental onslaughts on a reproduction of the system, we demonstrate how such aggressors could aim the election waiters or voters’ clients to change election consequences or sabotage the legitimacy of the system. Our findings illustrate the practical obstructions to Internet voting in the modern universe, and they carry lessons for Estonia, for other states sing following such systems, and for the security research community.
Walter Dean Burnham said, “Electoral political relations is non the background ; it is the kernel, the anchor of the political procedure. The large issues, such as military, economic, and public assistance policy are influenced by the electorate’s opinions” ( cited in Neuman, 1986, pp. 1–2 ) . Scholars study voting behaviour because it matters for the creative activity and execution of public policy in democracies. For the intents of this research paper, voting behaviour can be broken down into two subdivisions: ballot pick and ballot determination. Vote pick is defined as organizing an sentiment in support of one campaigner over another. A ballot pick must be made before an existent ballot is cast. A ballot determination is defined as make up one's minding whether to take portion in the participatory action of voting. Therefore, voting is a two-step procedure. Peoples must take which campaigners they prefer, and they must make up one's mind if they are traveling to vote at all.
This research paper discusses five different theories of voting behaviour: ( 1 ) the sociological theory of ballot pick, which is based on Berelson and Lazarsfeld’s ( Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954 ; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944 ) Columbia surveies ; ( 2 ) theories of media and ballot pick ( Zaller, 1992 ) ; ( 3 ) rational pick theory, which is an economic theory based statement most notably proposed by Downs ( 1957 ) ; ( 4 ) the psychological theory of voting behaviour, which is based on the work of Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes ( 1960 ) ; and ( 5 ) the theory of societal capital, which is a cultural theory most notably posited by Putnam ( 1993, 1995, 2000 ) .
II. Sociological Theory of Opinion Formation
The first determination suggests that the wealthiest grouping of Americans is the most likely to back up the Republican Party. Most people would hold assumed this result ; nevertheless, more interesting is the determination that there is an age cohort consequence. That is to state, persons who came of age during the Great Depression show a much more intense inclination to do ballot picks based on socioeconomic standing. Berelson et Al. ( 1954 ) property this determination to societal and political conditions at the clip of socialisation for the younger age cohorts. The social conditions during the Great Depression caused younger cohorts to see the political environment otherwise than those before them.
Berelson et Al. ( 1954 ) further find that Catholics vote otherwise than Protestants. This determination is non merely a specious relationship, harmonizing to Berelson et al. , but instead a factor intrinsic to Catholicism and Protestantism. Populating within a Catholic or Protestant society has an consequence on ballot pick. Furthermore, those associated more closely with Catholicism ( that is, practising Catholics as opposed to nonpracticing Catholics ) are likely to do a different ballot pick than Protestants. This same relationship was found for other minority groups at the clip. This, harmonizing to Berelson et al. , occurs because of societal cleavages. Social interactions within groups affect the ballot picks of the members of those groups.
Berelson et Al. ( 1954 ) further find that kids tend to keep the same sentiments refering campaigners as their parents and ballot for campaigners of the same parties as their parents ; nevertheless, these forms are strongly influenced by the societal context the kids find themselves in at the clip of sentiment formation and voting. If a kid holds a societal position similar to that of his or her parents, he or she is likely to vote in similar forms. Conversely, if a child’s societal position is non similar to that of his or her parents, he or she is likely to do different ballot picks than his or her parents.
III. Theories of Media and Opinion Formation
Zaller ( 1992 ) besides argues that expressed sentiments tend to be unstable. He contends that individuals’ sentiments are based on considerations that are most easy accessible to the person at any peculiar clip. When a individual expresses an sentiment, harmonizing to Zaller, he or she is non showing a deeply felt sentiment but is taking a set of considerations that he or she remembers from elect discourse in the mass media and showing an sentiment based on these considerations. If asked for an sentiment at another clip, a different set of considerations may be sampled and the sentiment may alter. This means that people hold sentiments that can hover. Vote pick is so based on sentiments that vacillate based on elect discourses that are sampled at the clip of voting.
Zaller’s ( 1992 ) theory and findings are really penurious. The statement that the media greatly affect sentiments and ballot pick is supported by earlier research as good. Iyengar and Kinder ( 1987 ) happen support for the function of mass media through media priming, media framing, and agenda puting. Neuman ( 1986 ) presents an statement that supports Zaller’s decision that media’s effects are based on the edification of the audience ; nevertheless, he comes to the decision that media have small consequence on sentiment formation and ballot pick. Neuman’s theory is predicated on the thought that mass media is amusement oriented instead than political-communication oriented. Further, Neuman presents grounds that even when people do encounter political communicating, they can retrieve merely about 5 % of the information they receive. Neuman, nevertheless, does hold with Zaller that the politically cognizant have more information from the media than those who are less politically cognizant, but he believes that this greatly constrains the consequence of the media, unlike Zaller, who posits that the media still has a big consequence, despite the differences of political edification.
IV. Rational Choice, Opinion Formation, and Voting Behavior
A noteworthy accommodation to the conventional theory of rational ballot pick is the directional theory of issue voting ( Rabinowitz & MacDonald, 1989 ) . In this theory, Rabinowitz and MacDonald argue that people still place themselves and campaigners on a continuum ; nevertheless, people do non needfully take the campaigner that is closest to themselves. Rather, Rabinowitz and MacDonald theorize that persons hold a peculiar affinity toward one way of policy devising, which is right or left. The basic thought of Rabinowitz and MacDonald’s theoretical account is that people act in a rational mode ; nevertheless, if a individual has an affinity to more left-of-center policy, he or she will non back up a right-winger campaigner, even if that campaigner is closer to his or her place on the continuum than the closest left-of-center campaigner. Rabinowtiz and MacDonald argue that people will non leap the centre point of the continuum and back up a campaigner on the other side of the continuum.
Understanding how rational pick leads to vote determinations requires a more in-depth expression at the theory of rational pick. The rational pick position assumes that persons possess complete information refering the costs and benefits of voting. The costs of voting are any type of public-service corporation expended in fixing to vote or really voting. The benefits of voting are any types of public-service corporation gained from the election of preferable campaigners. Deciding to vote, nevertheless, is non merely a computation of the costs and benefits but besides the likeliness of doing a difference in an election. This is because one person does non hold the concluding say in who takes office and who does non. Each person is one of many electors who jointly decide who will take. Therefore, the likeliness that the person will do a difference must be taken into history. Therefore, the voting concretion foremost posited by Downs ( 1957 ) is merely stated since the chance of an single voting is a merchandise of the likeliness that one will do an electoral difference times the benefits one will have from voting minus the costs of voting.
A ballot determination requires that a individual foremost know the costs and benefits of voting every bit good as the likeliness of doing a difference. The costs of voting are rather varied. Monetary costs of voting can run from the cost of the gasolene needed to drive to a canvassing topographic point to taking clip off from work to vote. Temporal costs of voting are any state of affairss in which 1 must take clip from one activity to prosecute in a political activity, such as garnering information on campaigners in order to do an informed determination. In add-on to the clip and energy spent informing oneself about campaigners and the existent act of voting, costs include any effects of governmental end products that decrease an individual’s public-service corporation. For illustration, if an single receives most of his income from Social Security and a campaigner is elected who desires Social Security reform that will diminish payments, the person will lose money, which is a cost.
The benefits of voting are derived from governmental end products that increase an individual’s public-service corporation. To gauge the benefits derived from governmental end products an single must gauge what each campaigner will make for him or her if elected. A individual decides if a campaigner will provide him or her with greater public-service corporation by puting the campaigner on a left–right continuum, as discussed antecedently. If a campaigner is near to the person on the continuum, the individual’s public-service corporation to be received is estimated to be high. If the campaigner is far from the person on the left–right continuum, the future public-service corporation of the person is estimated to be low. After gauging the cost and benefits of voting, the possible participant so must besides gauge the likeliness of doing a difference in an election. If the benefits multiplied by the likeliness of doing a difference in an election still outweighs the costs of voting, an person will make up one's mind to vote: a positive ballot determination.
B. The D Term
One of the most widely cited attacks used to explicate the engagement paradox is Riker and Ordeshook’s ( 1973 ) add-on of the “D term, ” or responsibility, into the voting concretion. This account supplies a benefit to get the better of the costs of voting that is non associated with public-service corporation gained from the election of a peculiar campaigner. Any enjoyable experience derived from the action of voting can be labeled the D term every bit long as it is non a benefit received from the election of a preferable campaigner. The D term creates an excess benefit to engagement that helps get the better of the huge costs of voting and preparing to vote and therefore causes people to do a positive ballot determination.
D. Informational Shortcuts
As stated antecedently, informing oneself about campaigners is a major temporal cost of voting. If the costs of voting are reduced instead than the benefits of voting increased, voting becomes rational. Reducing the informational costs of engagement, hence, can explicate why people vote despite its unreason. Popkin ( 1991 ) argues that assorted heuristics or cutoffs are used by persons in evaluating, obtaining, and hive awaying information to diminish the costs of take parting. Persons, harmonizing to Popkin, pick up information through mundane interactions and media. Prospective electors can take this little sum of information and use it in such a manner as to organize an sentiment about each campaigner, efficaciously cut downing the costs of engagement and explicating why persons overcome the unreason of voting.
E. Procedural Rationality
Procedural reason makes many of the same premises of traditional reason. Those moving in a procedurally rational mode still seek to increase their public-service corporation, still order their penchants, and seek to accomplish their ordered ends in the most efficient manner available to the histrion ; nevertheless, procedural reason does non necessitate merely one class of action. Procedural reason means that behaviour “is the result of appropriate deliberation” ( Simon, 1976, p. 131 ) . This means that an person who wants to make Goal A may hold more than one way to that end because, due to uncertainness and uncomplete information, the most efficient way may non be the clearest way. Equally long as a individual puts thought into his or her actions instead than merely moving impetuously, the action may be considered rational. Procedural reason is much like traditional reason except that it creates more realistic waies for histrions, but it besides assumes that histrions will non prosecute in an activity that they realize is more dearly-won than good. If behaviour is an “impulsive response to affective mechanisms” ( Simon, 1976, p. 131 ) , it is considered irrational. Therefore, it is possible to hold imperfect information and maintain reason, every bit long as the person has made an attempt to do the most efficient determination based on the information available. However, if the person knows that an action will lose him or her public-service corporation and still engages in the action, he or she would be considered to be moving irrationally.
V. Psychological Theory of Opinion Formation and Voting
Another theory that explains both ballot pick and ballot determination is the theory frequently referred to as a psychological theory. The most noteworthy advocates of this theory are Campbell et al. ( 1960 ) . They argued that people hold a figure of attitudes refering issues and campaigners. They specifically discussed six attitudes: ( 1 ) how one feels about the Democrat, ( 2 ) how one feels about the Republican, ( 3 ) how good each party manages authoritiess, ( 4 ) how good each party manages group involvements, ( 5 ) how good each party manages domestic policy, and ( 6 ) how good each party manages foreign policy. These attitudes, which are derived from party designation, steer a person’s ballot pick. These different attitudes, harmonizing to Campbell et al. , affect which candidate a individual supports, as would be expected positive attitudes toward a peculiar campaigner, a peculiar party, and a candidate’s policies lead one to back up that peculiar campaigner.
Fiorina ( 1981 ) argued that people do non hammer psychological connexions to political parties, but instead, they engage in “retrospective voting.” This means that alternatively of party designation colourising people’s ballot picks, people are measuring old party and campaigner public presentation and make up one's minding if a peculiar party has increased their ain public-service corporation or decreased it. Voters keep a running tally in their heads of which party has increased their ain public-service corporation. The connexion research workers observe between a elector and a party is a person’s positive run for that party. This, nevertheless, besides means that party designation can alter as people recalculate their runs. If this is the instance, party designation does non colourise attitudes and Campbell et al.’s ( 1960 ) account of ballot pick may non be accurate.
Other factors were besides found to impact an individual’s ballot determination. One of Campbell et al.’s ( 1960 ) major findings is that the strength of partizan penchant is a major factor in finding turnout. Those who strongly back up a party are more likely to vote. Further, those who strongly back up a party are more likely to experience an importance in voting. These two findings fit together really easy. Those who feel a strong degree of support for one party are more likely to see voting as of import and hence are more inclined to vote. This is intuitive. Peoples are more likely to prosecute in an action they deem to be of import, whereas if a individual does non believe something is of import, he or she is much less likely to prosecute in that action. Furthermore, it makes sense that people with a strong party designation are more likely to see voting as of import. If a individual has a psychological connexion to a party, he or she would, logically, besides want that party to win.
VI. Social Capital and Voting
Using General Social Survey informations, Putnam ( 1995 ) finds that rank in organisations has declined in the United States. This diminution in organisational rank, harmonizing to Putnam ( 1995, 2000 ) , is associated with a diminution in societal capital. Putnam argues that the lessening in societal capital is responsible for the lessening in elector turnout in recent U.S. history. Bing a member of an organisation builds societal capital, which instills in people a desire to take part in administration ( 1993, 1995, 2000 ) . Although Putnam’s ( 1995, 2000 ) grounds seems strong, it is of import to observe that Putnam’s work has been criticized ( Jackman & Miller, 1998 ) . Some critics argue that the connexion between democratic engagement and societal capital is non clear. Further unfavorable judgments of Putnam’s work have focused on other theoretic and methodological jobs ( Jackman & Miller ) . Despite the many unfavorable judgments of Putnam’s work, societal capital is still widely studied.
VII. Recent Research
Most research today is based in the aforesaid plants but has significantly elaborated on them. One of the most researched theories of ballot pick is the spacial theoretical account associated with rational pick theory. Jessee ( 2009 ) tested the chief maxims of the spacial voting theoretical account and found that “behavior is in close conformity with the cardinal maxims of the basic spacial voting model” ( p. 59 ) . Using a step of elector political orientation based on place pickings, Jessee tested the spacial voting theoretical account for the 2004 U.S. presidential election. He finds that the spacial theoretical account is by and large right but is influenced by partizan prejudice.
There have besides been recent progresss in the survey of ballot pick based on the type of election. Feddersen, Gailmard, and Sandroni ( 2009 ) theorized that big elections create an ambiance where people tend non to vote based on stuff benefits, as per rational pick theory, but alternatively ballot based on who they believe is the morally superior campaigner. As the likeliness of being the difference shaper in an election decreases, rational pick theory dictates that people will non vote because they will probably have the same benefits whether they vote or non. However, Feddersen et Al. argue that people can have an expressive benefit, which is a benefit received from showing oneself. Feddersen et Al. happen, utilizing an experimental design, that in big elections people tend non to be self-interested in their ballot pick, but instead tend to back up the morally superior campaigner.
Further, research refering ballot determinations has late turned to societal psychological theories. Using a field experimental design, Gerber, Green, and Larimer ( 2008 ) found that societal force per unit area is causally related to vote determinations. This lends support to the claim that force per unit area to adhere to societal norms plays a major function in doing persons to vote. Nickerson ( 2008 ) besides uses a field experiment to prove the consequence of societal interactions on ballot determination. He finds that when one individual in a family is encouraged to vote, the individual contacted every bit good as others in that same family will be given to vote.
Finally, a recent country of ballot determination research has arisen based in familial research. Findingss by Fowler, Baker, and Dawes ( 2008 ) show that ballot determination, and political engagement more loosely, can be at least slightly attributed to a person’s familial construction. Fowler et Al. used a quasi-experimental design to prove for differences in ballot determination between dizygous ( fraternal ) and monozygotic ( indistinguishable ) twins. They find that when twins are indistinguishable, they are more likely to vote in the same figure of elections than when twins are fraternal, therefore set uping that a person’s ballot determination is at least slightly influenced by his or her familial construction.
VIII. Future Directions
Finally, it is of import to observe that voting behaviour has been studied quantitatively for more than 60 old ages. It appears that political scientists have virtually exhausted the inquiries refering voting behaviour that can be answered utilizing simple study informations. Political scientists have established many correlativities between variables, but it is now of import for research workers to set up causal links. Research traveling frontward must utilize interesting and fresh research designs to set up causality. Obviously, this must be done utilizing experimental and quasi-experimental research designs.
The 2nd theory discussed antecedently concerns the function of the mass media in ballot pick. This theory is based on the premiss that people have comparatively incoherent sentiments and attitudes. However, people receive information as elect discourse through the mass media. Those who pay a big sum of attending to the media receive greater information and cull information that is incoherent with old information. Those who do non pay a big sum of attending to the media receive less information and tend to reject less information, hence making incoherent sentiments. Further, people do non keep inactive sentiments, but instead organize their sentiments based on the information that is most easy accessed.
The rational pick position argues that persons wish to maximise their public-service corporation. This desire causes people to hold positive sentiments of the campaigner running for office that they believe will maximise their public-service corporation. This theory relies on holding the information necessary to put campaigners and oneself on a left–right continuum right and construing the arrangement of these campaigners right. In footings of ballot determination, this theory argues that prospective electors decide whether the benefits they receive from voting for the campaigner they support outweigh the costs of voting. If the benefits do outweigh the costs, the prospective electors will go existent electors. If the costs are greater than the benefits, prospective electors will non vote.
The 4th theory discussed is the psychological attack. This theory posits that persons have a psychological affinity toward one party or another. This affinity colors the individual’s attitudes refering campaigners. The sentiments a individual holds refering campaigners for office and political issues are derived from the psychological affinity a individual holds toward a peculiar party, besides known as party designation. Further, this theory posits that persons vote for a figure of psychological grounds, the most of import being the strength of partizan association. If a individual is strongly affiliated with a party, he or she is more likely to vote, unless he or she views an election as nonreversible. The psychological theory further postulates that involvement in runs, caring about the result of an election, feelings of political efficaciousness, and civic responsibility all inspire people to vote.
To understand why a individual ballot per race tends to prefer less centric campaigners, see a simple lab experiment where pupils in a category ballot for their favourite marble. If five marbles are assigned names and are placed `` up for election, '' and if three of them are green, one is red, and one is bluish, so a green marble will seldom win the election. The ground is that the three green marbles will divide the ballots of those who prefer green. In fact, in this analogy, the lone manner that a green marble is likely to win is if more than 60 per centum of the electors prefer green. If the same per centum of people prefer green as those who prefer ruddy and bluish, that is to state if 33 per centum of the electors prefer green, 33 per centum prefer blue, and 33 per centum prefer ruddy, so each green marble will merely acquire 11 per centum of the ballot, while the ruddy and bluish marbles will each acquire 33 per centum, seting the green marbles at a serious disadvantage. If the experiment is repeated with other colourss, the colour that is in the bulk will still seldom win. In other words, from a strictly mathematical position, a single-vote system tends to prefer a victor that is different from the bulk. If the experiment is repeated utilizing blessing voting, where electors are encouraged to vote for every bit many campaigners as they approve of, so the victor is much more likely to be any one of the five marbles, because people who prefer green will be able to vote for every one of the green marbles.
An option to the Two-round voting system is the individual unit of ammunition instant-runoff voting system ( Besides referred to as Alternate ballot or Preferential voting ) as used in some elections in Australia, Ireland and the USA. Voters rank each campaigner in order of penchant ( 1,2,3 etc. ) . Votes are distributed to each campaigner harmonizing to the penchants allocated. If no individual campaigner has 50 % or more ballots than the campaigner with the least ballots is excluded and their ballots redistributed harmonizing to the electors nominated order of penchant. The procedure reiterating itself until a campaigner has 50 % or more ballots. The system is designed to bring forth the same consequence as an thorough ballot but utilizing merely a individual unit of ammunition of voting.
Negative voting allows a ballot that expresses disapproval of a campaigner. For explanatory intents, see a conjectural voting system that uses negative voting. In this system, one ballot is allowed, with the pick of either for a campaigner, or against a campaigner. Each positive ballot adds one to a campaigner 's overall sum, while a negative ballot subtracts one, geting at a net favorability. The campaigner with the highest net favorability is the victor. Note that non merely is a negative sum possible, but besides, a campaigner may even be elected with 0 ballots if adequate negative ballots are cast against their oppositions.
A-voters once more, with the clear advantage of 40 % , logically ballot for Candidate A. B-voters once more, split precisely in half. Each B-voter decides to vote negatively against their least favourite campaigner, with the logical thinking that this negative ballot allows them to show blessing for the two other campaigners. C-voters besides decide to vote negatively against Candidate A, concluding along similar lines. Candidate B is the victor with 0 ballots. Enough negative ballots were cast against Candidate B 's oppositions, ensuing in negative sums. Candidate A, despite holding polled at 40 % , winds up with -5 % , offset due to the aggregative 45 % of negative ballots cast by B and C electors. Candidate C ends up with -15 % .
Meetings and assemblages
Whenever several people who do non all agree demand to do some determination, voting is a really common manner of making a determination peacefully. The right to vote is normally restricted to certain people. Members of a society or nine, or stockholders of a company, but non foreigners, may elect its officers, or follow or alter its regulations, in a similar manner to the election of people to official places. A panel of Judgess, either formal judicial governments or, say, Judgess of a competition, may do determinations by voting. A group of friends or members of a household may make up one's mind which movie to see by voting. The method of voting can run from formal entry of written ballots, through show of custodies, voice voting or audience response systems, to informal observing which outcome seems to be preferred by more people.
See other subjects:
cloning human beings,
improper garbage disposal,
corruption in philippines,
unemployment rate in philippines,
teenage pregnancy pdf,
tsunami in japan,
oil price hike,
bamboo in architecture,
teenage pregnancy introduction,
improper waste disposal,
poverty in philippines,
causes of poverty,